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IN THE; SUPREME COURT OF THE; STATS OF U1'Ah
R. MILTON YORGASON,
Salt Lake County Assessor,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, ex. rel.,
EPISCOPAL MANAGEMENT CORP.,

Case No. 18986

Defendant and Respondent.)
Defendant and respondent Episcopal Managenent Corporation
(hereinafter "Respondent"), by and through its attorneys, Fabian

&

Clendenin, submit the following Brief in response to the Brief on
Appeal of plaintiff and appellant.
STATEMENT OF ThE CASE
Plaintiff and Appellant (hereinafter "Appellant") caused
the real property and improvements located at 650 South 3rd East,
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County to be assessed and taxed, claiming
that the property was not eligible for a charitable exemption under
Article XIII,

§

2 of the Utah Constitution.
LEGAL POSTURE OF THESE PROCEEDINGS

On November 14, 1980, the Salt Lake County Boara of
Equalization found the property located at 650 South 3rd East in
Salt Lake City, known as "St. Mark's Tower," to be exempt from real
property tax because it was used exclusively for charitable purposes
within the meaning of Article XIII, Section 2 of the Constitution of
the State of Utah.

Appellant appealed this decision to the Utah

State Tax Commission, which held a formal hearing on September 25,

1981.

On May 3, 1982 the Tax Commission is;u"d

its f1nc11nys of

fact, conclusions of law unanimously dtfHmln'J the ruliny of the
Board of Equalization and holding the property to be exempt trom
taxation under the terms of Article XIII,

2.

Appellant

appealed the Tax Commission's decision to the Third Jua1c1al
District Court, Tax Division, Salt Lake County.

The parties have

stipulated that the decision of this Court shall be effective for
tax years 1980, 1981 and 1982.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties have entered into a Stipulation of Facts.
Included in the Stipulation is an agreement that the transcript of
the formal hearing before the Tax Commission may be used in the
disposition of this case.

The specific facts reflected in the

record are those existent at the date of the formal hearing before
the Tax Commission on September 25, 1981, but mutatis mutanais,
these facts may be assumed to apply to all three tax years in
question.
Appellant's statement of the facts is incomplete for a
proper understanding of the issues involved and wholly disregards
the many ways in which St. Mark's Tower provides a benefit to the
community by meeting important social needs and the contributions
made to the project by Respondent.

Therefore, a brief recitation of

the facts is in order.
Episcopal Management Corporation is a Utah non-prof it
corporation.

Its Articles of Incorporation are attached to the

Stipulation of Facts.

The Fifth Article recites in specific detail

the exclusive charitable purpose of the corporation.
-2-

It

is

stipulated that the actual use to which St. Mark's Tower is being
put is consistent ana in conformity with these Articles.
The

(R.

39).

corporation has been given tax-exempc status by the Internal

Revenue Service

(tax exempt No.

IC 30-82).

The Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Utah is ex officio a
member of the Board of Directors.

The Board, consisting of seven

members, serves without compensation.
policy decisions.

(R.

It meets monthly to make

38).

The corporation acquired certain real property at 650 South
3rd East in Salt Lake City

(the legal description is Lot 7, Block

19, Plat A, Salt Lake City Survey) and constructed on it a 10 story
building known as "St. Mark's Tower."

(R.

34).

The Tower was

acquired, constructed and operated through funding from the U.S.
government under Section 202 of the National Housing Act of 1959 (12
U.S.C.

§

l 70lq

(R.

36-37).

The corporation received a loan

from the Department of Housing and Urban Development of $3,638,600,
for construction, secured by a mortgage which made Episcopal
Management Corporation liable for failure to make the necessary
payments.

(R.

37).

St. Mark's Tower is managed by Danville Development
Corporation, a corporation organized for profit, which receives 7%
of the gross rents collected.

This arrangement is mandated by HUD

regulations, which require that non-profit corporations financed
under § 202 of the National Housing Act of 1959 (12 U.S.C. § 170lq
enter into management contracts.

Episcopal Management

Corporation's contract with Danville has been approved by HUD.
director of St. Mark's Tower, Ms. Vicki P. Cotterell, has
-3-

The

certification in gerontology and halos u l<. A.
from Kansas State University.

(R.

programs for the tenants.

38).

(k.

36).

'J""'j

rc:.o in psycholog 1

She organizes social

The Tower consists of 98 rental units together with a
commons room where the social services and recreation activities
offered, a resident manager's apartment, and several offices useo bf
the administration.

(R.

36).

There are no commercial businesses

(such as a restaurant or physician's office)
(R.

in the building.

36).
To be eligible to reside in the Towers, a tenant must be

over 62 years of age or handicapped.
tenants may be handicapped.

(R.

No more than 10% of the

37).

As of January, 1981, no

tenant may have income in excess of $12,000 per year,
$13,700 per year for a married couple.

There is no discrimination

or preference based on religion, race or sex.
at present 102 tenants.
$4,600.

if single, or

(R.

37).

There are

The average annual income ot residents is

The highest income is $9,500 and the lowest is $1,900.

(Tr. 13 and last page of Exhibit 3 attachea thereto).
verification of income figures is made.

Inue!Jendent

(Tr. 15).

The rent for each unit is established by HUD on the basis
of fair market value for equivalent private facilities in the
community.

As of January, 1981, the rent is $433/month per unit.

The tenant pays 25% of his adjusted gross annual income toward
rent.
month.

The average monthly rent paid by the tenants is $96 per
(R. 37).

The difference between the rent paid by the tenant

and the established fair market rent is paid by HUD.
indebtedness is paid from the proceeds of the tenants'
-4-

The mortgage
rental

payments and HUD subsidies, as are the operating expenses.
excess must be

to reouce the mortgage.

(k.

Any

38).

The Episcopal Management Corporation has made, and is
continuing to make, substantial contributions toward the complex, in
addition to agreeing to become personally liable on the mortgage
discussed earlier and set forth at R.

37).

(as

The corporation's Board

of Directors, consisting of seven members, as one of its functions,
meets once each month to make policy decisions with regard to the
operation of St. Mark's Tower.

serve without compensation.

(R.

All Board Members are volunteers and
38).

Approximately 1,250 man hours

were spent by volunteers on behalf of the Episcopal Diocese of Utah
-- the parent of Episcopal Management Corporation -- in negotiations
with HUD that led to the financing agreement between HUD and
Episcopal Management Corporation, the selection of the building
site, the construction of St. Mark's Tower, and the selection of the
managing agent.
time.

None of the volunteers were compensated for their

In addition, approximately $1,500 was incurred in travel

expenses, all paid for by the Episcopal Diocese of Utah, and not
reimbursed by the Episcopal Management Corporation.

(R.

39).

The record also makes clear that St. Mark's Tower provides
a great benefit to he community by serving a great social need.

The

undisputed testimony is that the project saves the State government
much more than the roughly $40,000 a year that Salt Lake County
would gain in revenues from a tax assessraent on the proprty.
39-40'

72).

(Tr.

Moreover, there are an insufficient number of

County-owned facilities for the type of people served by St. Mark's
Tower.

It is estimated that there are 26,000 people in Salt Lake
-5-

County who meet HUD guidelines for nousing need, 1et there are less
than a thousand county units availaole tor

these µeople.

( 'l'r.

b 71

The public housing authorities view oµerations such as St. Mark's
Tower as a most valuable complement to their program and a benefit
(Tr.

to governmental activity in this area.

76-68).

Housing operations for the elderly and handicapped are very
limited.

They may go to buildings that provide single room

occupancy

("SRO").

The possible horror of such an option is

described by Ms. Cotterell.

(Tr. 17-19).

They may go to rest

homes, where it is undisputed that the cost is substantially greater
than the cost per resident at places such as St. Mark's Tower.
(R. 38; Tr. 39-40, 72).

It is ironic that an estimated 20% of those

in more expensive rest homes are there, not because they need rest
home care, but because they have no place else to go.

(Tr. 50).

They may go live with their children, although experience shows that
this often leads to severe emotional problems and strains family
relations.

(Tr. 32).

Or they may go to a community such as that

which exists at St. Mark's Tower.
are experts in this field,

All of the witnesses called, who

agreed that this latter alternative was

by far the most desirable and by far the cheapest alternative for
society.

The physhic and other advantages of the St. Mark's Tower

experience extend the time before more expenseive
institutionalization is required.

(Tr.

51-53).

ARGUMENT
I.

RESPONDENT'S USE OF THE PROPERTY MEETS THE "CHARITABLE PUkPOSE"
TEST ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT IN FRIENDSHIP MANOk.
Appellant relies upon Friendship Manor Corp. v. Tax

Commission,

487 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1971)
-6-

to justify taxation of st.

Mark's Tower.
misplaced,

Respondent submits that such reliance is totally

and that the factors which were found to be significant

in finding non-exemption in Friendship Manor are the very ones which
are not present in the case of St. Mark's Tower.
Friendship Manor involved an apartment building of 228
units.

Tenants in the Manor had to meet certain requirements.

Eighty percent of them had to be over 62 years olJ.
ambulatory.

They must be

They must be financially able to pay the rent

established and the Manor did not accept tenants if they were not
financially able to maintain or pay the expenses and maintain the
standard of living which was required.

Rents were established so

that the total amount collected met all expenses plus amortization
of interest and principal on the mortgage.

Certain commercial

businesses were also allowed to· operate in the building.
Supreme Court ruled that under these facts,

The Utah

the Manor should not be

exempt from taxation:
Where the senior citizen is paying for all of the
services he receives and the rental of the apartments is not
determined by need, but is determined by what is required to
retire the principal and interest of the mortgage, together with
all upkeep and operation expenses, no charitable purpose is
involved.
The state does not have the obligation to provide
living accommodations to persons well able and willing to pay
for their needs.
487 P.2d at 1280.
In so holding, this Court established a test for
determining what is a charitable use.

If rental payments are

insufficient to cover the cost of the complex, and are adJusted to
reflect each tenant's ability to pay, then a charitable exemption is
available; otherwise,

it is not.

In the case of St. Mark's Tower,

-7-

the resident does not pay the full cost of all tl,e services he
receives and the rental paid by each resident is aeterm1nea oy nee, 1
(i.e. 25% of his total income).
Respondent does not quarrel with the result in Friendship
Manor.

It establishes sound public policy.

Indeed, the very

differences between the operation of St. Mark's Tower and
Manor are the very differences this Court has looked to in
determining what is a charitable use under the "Friendship Manor
test".
Appellant argues that St. Mark's Tower fails the Friendsh1e
Manor test, since the "rental actually due" is not based on each
tenant's ability to pay.

This contention misstates the facts of

this case, as the tenants are not required, expected or encouraged
to pay anything above 25% of their income for rental.

Since

Friendship Manor looks solely to whether the tenant is paying a
rental based on his ability to pay, the Friendship Manor test is
satisfied here.
Appellant also relies on Beerman Foundation, lnc. v. Board
of Tax Appeals, 87 N.E.

2d 474 (Ohio 1949), which states that if tne

tenants of a housing complex are required to pay any rental, the
complex's property is not used for charitable purposes.

Beerman,

however, reflects the minority view; the prevailing view, which has
become almost universally accepted in more recent cases, is that tt1e
charitable use is not destroyed if the tenants do pay some rent,
especially if the amount is adjusted to reflect their ability to pay
and is below the market rate -- as is the case here.

see,

Fredericka Home v. San Diego County, 221 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1950); 71
-8-

Am.Jur.2d State and Loci.ll Taxation,§ 373

(1973).

Utah adopted the

maJor1ty view in Friendship Manor, which hela that a charitable
exemption can be available even if tenants are required to pay rent,
so long as the rent charged each tenant is adjusted to reflect his
or her ability to pay.

Friendship Manor,

487 P.2d at 1280.

See

also Salt Lake County v. Tax Commission ex rel. Laborers Local No.
205, 658 P.2d 1192, 1198-9 (Utah 1983)

(Oaks, Chief Justice,

concurring).
II.

HOUSING FOR ELDERLY AND HANDICAPPED PEOPLE CAN BE A CHARITABLE
PURPOSE IF THE FRIENDSHIP MANOR TEST IS SATISFIED.
Appellant also argues that the housing of senior citizens

and the handicapped can never constitute a charitable use of
property.

Among the cases cited by appellant for this proposition

is United Presbyterian Association v. Board of County Commissioners,
448 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1975), where the court stated that "the
furnishing of homes to older adults is not in itself a charitable
purpose."

Id. at 975.

But the court did not hold that such a use

could never be charitable; rather, it held that under the facts of
that particular case, there was no charitable use.

The court found

that there was "material reciprocity between alleged recipients and
their alleged donors."

Id. at 976.

In other words, there was a

market-type relationship between the landlord and tenants in which
the tenants paid market rents which were not adJusted to reflect the
tenant's ability co pay.
The United Presbyterian approach is very similar to that of
Friendship Manor.

This is not surprising, as Friendship Manor

relied heavily on United Presbyterian.
-9-

Thus, Friendship Manor

establishes that under Utah law a housing complex tnr elGerly ana
handicapped people is a charitable use it till" Fr ll'n'c >11ip i'lanor test
is satisfied, notwithstanding any contrJry authority tr0m other
states, including two other cases cited oy Appellant,
Manor of Kansas City v. State Tax Comm1ssior2,

Paraclete

447 S.W.Ld Jll

1969), and Beerman Foundation Inc. v. Board of Tax Appeals,

(Mo.
87

N.E. 2d 474 (Ohio 1949).
III.

POSSIBLE FUTURE SALE OF PROPERTY DOES NOT AFFECT ITS EXEMPTIUt,.
Appellant contends that since the Episcopal Diocese of Utan

-- the parent of respondent -- may be able to sell the St. Mark's
Tower property at some future date for a substantial consideration,
the Diocese could benefit from the property, which is therefore not
being used exclusively for charitable purposes and hence is
ineligible for a

exemption.

In support of this argument,

Appellant cites several cases, all of which are readily
distinguishable in that they involve the receipt by a non-profit
corporation of income resulting from continuing activities carried
out on the property, and not revenues derived by the corporation
from the sale of the property.
In Parker v. Quinn, 64 P. 961

(Utah 1901), pai:t of the

property in question was rented out by the nonprofit corporate
owner, which applied the rental payments to charitable endeavors;
this Court held that the charitable exemption was unavailable as to
that part of the property, since it was not being used exclusively
for charitable purposes.

Ia. at 962.

Similarly,

in Malad Second

Ward of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. State
Commission,

269 P.2d 1077 (Idaho 1954), the court held that land
-10-

'!'dX

owneo by a nonprofit corporation on which wheat was raisea was not
oeing used exclusively for charitable purposes, even though the
wheat was distributed to the needy as part of a cnaritable program;
the court equated the harvesting of the wheat with the receipt of
income from the property.

Id. at 1079.

Appellant has cited no cases in which the possible future
sale of property used for charitable purposes, the proceeds of which
go to the nonprofit corporate seller, was held to disqualify tne
property from a charitable deauction.
knowledge,
reasons.

there are no such cases.

To the best of Respondent's
This is not surprising, for two

First, such a doctrine would effectively eliminate the

charitable exemption from ad valorem property taxation.

So long as

the property has any value, a future sale would always be possible
and the resulting gain to the potential seller would cause the
property to lose its exemption.

In the unlikely event that the
it would not need the exemption in

property is absolutely worthless,

order to escape ad valorem taxation, which by definition is levied
in proportion to the property's value, Callaway v. City of Overland
Park, 508 P.2d

907 (Kansas 1973).

Second -- conceding for the

moment that respondent's sale of property could at some time affect
the property exemption -- Appellant's argument runs afoul of the
rule that a mere prospective use of the property does not affect its
eligibility for a charitable exemption.

This rule is explicitly

applied to deny an exemption to property designated by its owners
tor a charitable use which has not materialized as of the date of
the assessment,

see,

Deeartment of Revenue,

Society of St. Vincent DePaul, Inc. v.
537 P. 2d 69

(Oregon 1975), but it is also

-11-

tacitly recognized to apply to the whole tielci uf chdritable
property tax exemptions by all courts, who confine their examination
of the property's uses to its past or present uses, not to
hypothetical future uses.
Order of Moose No.

See.

Friendship Manor, supra; Loyal

259 v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake

County, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982).

If Appellant believes that a

future sale of the property should result in a tax assessment, he
should raise this issue at the time of the sale, not at the present
time.
IV. ST. MARK'S TOWER COMPLIES WITH THE RELEVANT STATUTORY GUIDELINES.
Utah Code Annotated § 59-2-30 (1974) provides a statutory
clarification of the constitutional exemption:
Property Used for Religious Worship or Charitable Purposes Requirements for Exemption.
This section is intended to clarify
the scope of exemptions for property used exclusively for either
religious worship or charitable purposes provided for in section
2 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the state of Utah.
This section is not intended to expand or limit the scope of
such exemptions.
Any property whose use is dedicated to
religious worship or charitable purposes including property
which is incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of such religious worship or charitable purposes,
intended to benefit an indifinite number of persons is exempt
from taxation if all of the following requirements are met:
(1)
The user is not organized to produce a
profit from the use of the property.
(2)
No part of any net earnings, from the use ot
the property, inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, but any net earnings shall be
used directly or indirectly, for the charitable or
religious purposes of the organization.
(3)
The property is not used or operated by the
organization or other person so as to benefit any officer,
trustee, director, shareholder, lessor, member, employee,
contributor, or any other person through the distribution
of profits, payment of excessive charges or compensations.

-12-

(4)
Upon the liquidation, dissolution, or
abandonment of tne user no part of any proceeds derived
from such use will inure to the benefit of any private
person.
The Episcopal Management Corporation in its ownership and
operation of St. Mark's Tower complies fully with all of the
requirements of this statute.
(1)

Thus:

Episcopal Management Corporation is not organizea

to produce a profit from the use of the property.
(2)

No part of any net earnings from the use of St.

Mark's Tower inures to the benefit of any private shareholder,
individual, but any net earnings are used directly or indirectly
for the charitable purposes of the Episcopal Management
Corporation.
(3)

St. Mark's Tower is not used or operated by

Episcopal Management Corporation or any other person so as to
benefit any officer, trustee, director, shareholder, lessor,
member, employee, contributor, or any otiler person through the
distribution of profits, payment of excessive charges of
compensations.
(4)

Upon the liquidation, dissolution, or abandonment

of Episcopal Management Corporation, no part of any proceeds
derived from such use will inure to the benefit of any private
person.
V.

AN EXEMPTION SHOULD NOT BE DENIED BECAUSE THE CHARITABLE
ACTIVITES ARE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED.
Appellant further contends that Respondent's use of the

property is not "charitable" under Article XIII, § 2 of the Utah
Constitution because Respondent has not contributed anything of
-13-

value to the complex, as it is being paid for t>y cuncls fron1 the
Federal Government and from the tenants ut the proJect.
"source of funds" argument is tlawed for

two reasons.

This
tirst,

considerations of the source of funding tor charitable proJects are
not relevant in determining whether an exemption exists.

Second,

the record in this case shows that Respondent has made substantial
contributions to the complex.
A.

Source of Funds Irrelevant.
Even if the facts of this case showed that St. Mark's Tower

is entirely funded by its tenants and by the Federal Government, the
complex would still be entitled to a charitable exemption.

The only

seemingly contrary Utah authority came in Salt Lake County v. Tax
Commission ex rel. Laborers Local No.

295,

658 P.2d 1192 (Utah

1983), a case not even cited by Appellant.

In that case, this

Court, without any discussion of the issue, stated that an
apprenticeship program conducted by a group of labor unions "cannot
be classified as charitable because it is entirely funded througn a
combination of federal grants and tuition paid by

apprentices

themselves, rather than through the union or its members."

Id. at

1194.

Neither this Court nor the petitioners in that case -- who
had urged the court to accept this principle -- provided any
citations for this statement, and the respondent did not even deal
with the issue in its brief.

Moreover, the statement is clearly

dictum, as the court went on to hold that an exemption was
inapplicable because the activities conducted on the property
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including the apprent1cesh1p program -- were "rendered primarily on
hehalf of union members and their families."

Id.

The underlying

basis of tl11s Court's decision was that the primary reason for the
union's existence was to benefit its own members, a limited,
self-defined group.

Episcopal Management's sole purpose is to

benefit the elderly, a category into which all people will fall if
they live long enough.
The failure of the part of Laborers Local to fully discuss
the "source of funds" issue is made more remarkable by the fact that
its statement goes against the established doctrine in Utah that the
use of the property is exclusively determinative.

As this Court

said in Friendship Manor:
It is the use to which it puts its real property which is the
determination of whether or not such property is exempt.
487 P.2d at 1276 (emphasis supplied).

In subsequent exemption

cases, this Court has looked solely to the use of the property and
not to the source of funds.
Tax Commission,

See,

Eyring Research Institute v.

598 P. 2d 1348 (Utah 1979); Baker v. une Piece ot

Improved Real Property,

570 P. 2d 1028 (Utah 1977).

The idea that the existence of a gift can be negated by the
presence of government funds was rejected by Chief Justice Oaks in
his concurring opinion in Laborers Local:
A gift or sacrifice for the welfare of the community can be
identified .
. from a substantial imbalance in the exchanges
between the charitable organization and recipient (i.e. the
absence of reciprocity)
658 P.2d at 1198.
:-lanor use test.

The "absence of reciprocity" is the Friendship
Thus, as Chief Justice Oaks recognized, so long as
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there is a charitable use, a gift "'lem,,11t

£'fl:'::."ier1L,

relJarcJies.·:; ''l

the source of funds.
The lower court in this case alc;o refused to look b"yo11u
the use to the source of funds in holding tor an exemption:
. the tenants who are in need of charitable assistance are
receiving it in this housing.
To look to tne source of tunds L,
try to determine whether or not the activity is "charitable"
would create untold mischief.
What woula you do about the keu
Cross, Salvation Army, etc.?
Yorgason v. County Board of Equalization, Civil No. C 82-4002 at p.
2 (Third Judicial District, December 14, 1982).
The weight of authority from other states which have
expressly and fully considered the "source of funds" argument goes
against Appellant's contention.

In Franciscan Tertiary Province v.

State Tax Commission, 566 S.W.2d 213 (Mo. 1978), the court overruled
several earlier cases to hold that a housing proJect used for
charitable purposes does not lose its charitable exemption if the
funds for the project come solely from the government.

Id. at 226.

While the housing project in Franciscan was supported oy a
combination of federal funds and contributions from the nonprofit
corporate owner, the court expressly reaffirmed its earlier
in Bader Realty & Investment Co. v. St. Louis housing Authority, 217
S.W.2d 489 (Mo. 1949), which permitted a tax exemption for a housing
project whose funds came solely from government sources.
Franciscan, 566 S.W.2d at 226.
Like the lower court in this case, the Franciscan court
rejected the "source of funds" argument because it realized that the
argument could be applied to any charity, such as the ked Cross or
United Way, that obtains its funding from outside sources.
-16-

Franciscan also refuseJ to create a special "source of funds" theory
tor government grants,

a government grant has the same

eftect as a contribution from a private source:
money to finance these homes for the aged at interest
well below market rates, or providing for interest or rent
subsidies, does constitute a subsidy or contribution comparable
to charitable contributions from indiviauals or corporations.
They have the same effect.
566 S.W.2d at 22.

Franciscan is particularly apposite to this case because it
involved a housing project almost identical to St. Mark's Tower, and
because it construed a statute almost identical to Article XIII, § 2
of the Utah Constitution.

The statute there provided for an

exemption for property "used exclusively .

. for purposes purely

charitable", while the Utah Constitution's exemption is for property
"used exclusively for charitable purposes."

Of the Missouri

statute, Franciscan said:
The statute clearly makes the use of the property the focus of
the exemption .
[the] relevance [of other factors] is
strictly confined to the extent which they may indicate the
purpose for which the property is used and whether such purpose
is charitable.
566 S.W.2d at 223.

The court continued:

Furthermore, we cannot believe that it is the intent of the
people under [the statute] to withhold the financial assistance
of a tax exemption until such time as our elderly are totally
incapable of providing for themselves.
The whole thrust of
[such] projects .
. is to assist its tenants in avoiding such
status by providing an atmosphere where they can remain
self-sustaining as long as possible.
The payment of monthly
rent at [such) proJects may be for some as important as the
other valuable activities.
Although federal or other assistance
is obviously being provided, the sense of paying one's own way
can be an important intangible which reaffirms continued utility
and dignity.
)66 S.W.2d at 226.
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Since Franciscan involveo similar stotutory language ana an
almost identical housing corn[Jlex,

these comments dre elJually

applicable to the present case and

a highly persuasive

rationale for an exemption here.
The non-Utah cases cited by Appellant in support of its
"source of funds" argument are not on point.

Lutheran Home,

Board of County Commissioners, 505 P. 2d 1118 (Kansas 1973),

Inc. v.
involv€a

a nursing home where half of the tenants paid their rent out of
their own funds and the remaining tenants' rental was paid out of
welfare funds.

Id. at 1121.

The court noted that the property

owner expected to be paid -- from whatever source -- the full market
rental for each tenant.

Id. at 1125.

In addition, the court notea

that the nursing home was originally operated as a profit-making
enterprise which became insolvent and was reorganized into a
nonprofit corporation, which operated the nursing home in
essentially the same manner as did its predecessor.

The non-profit

corporation did not even have the word "charity" in its articles of
incorporation.

Id. at 1124-25.

The unmistakable conclusion is tnat

the court decided against an exemption largely to thwart a
reorganization of a for-profit business into a nonprofit corporation
for the sole purpose of reducing its tax burden.

No such situation

occurred here; St. Mark's Tower was conceived as, and has always
operated as, a nonprofit venture.

Moreover, Lutheran Horne's use of

the property was not exclusively charitable -- a requirement for an
exemption under the Kansas Constitution -- as there were no
financial need requirements and about half of the tenants were able
to pay their rent without any governmental assistance.
-18-

Id. at

1121.

Here, however, all of tne tenants are needy, so the property

is being used exclusively for the charitable purpose of providing
housing for low-income individuals.
Appellant also cites Paraclete Manor of Kansas City v.
State Tax Commission, 447 S.W.2d 311
its argument on this point.

(Mo. 1969), as authority for

However, Paraclete's requirement that

the charitable use not be wholly supported by government funds was
expressly overruled by Franciscan, suera, 566 S.W.2d at 224-6.
The remaining out-of-state cases cited by respondent are
wholly irrelevant to this issue since they involve questions of the
charitable use of the property, not the source of funds.

In Dow

City Senior Citizens Housing Inc. v. Board of Review of Crawford
County, 230 N.W.2d 497

(Iowa 1975), the court hela that there was no

charitable use of the property because the rent charged to the
tenants was at the market rate and was not adjusted by need.
499.

Id. at

The court did mention the fact that the project received

government assistance, but this was not a factor in its decision; it
merely held that since the property was not being used for
charitable purposes, the taxpayers should not be required to provide
an "exemption subsidy" in addition to the direct government payments
made to the project.

Id.

A similar rationale was the basis for

County of Douglas v. OEA Senior Citizens, Inc., 111 N.W.2d 719
(Nebraska 1961), where the court held that "the furnishing of
low-cost housing at its real cost" is not a charitable use.
725.

Id. at

Since Respondent does not require its tenants to pay a rent

equivalent to either the market rate or the cost of the project, but
rather adjusts the rent to reflect each tenant's ability to pay,
-19-

neither Dow City nor Douglas prevents a char1taole exempt1un here.
Finally, Hilltop Village v.

l\erville IndetJende11t School District,

487 S.W.2d 167 (Texas Civ. Ap!J. 1972), which held that a nursing
home that adjusted its rental charges to reflect each tenant's
ability to pay was not using the property for charitable purposes,
id. at 169, is directly contrary to the holding of this court in
Friendship Manor, whose exemption criteria are satisfied here, for
reasons previously discussed.
B.

Respondent Has Contributed to St. Mark's Tower.
Assuming arguendo that a contribution by Hespondent to St.

Mark's Tower would be necessary to sustain a charitable exemption
under Utah law, such an exemption would be available, since
Respondent has made substantial contributions of both money and
services to the complex.

These contributions, as described in the

record, have been almost totally ignored by Appellant in his summary
of the facts.

The money needed to build the complex was not donateo

to Respondent by the Department of Housing and Urban Development; it
was lent to Respondent by HUD under an agreement which makes
Respondent liable if it does not repay all amounts due.
The record below also indicates that for the proJect to
become a reality, approximately 1250 manhours were spent by
volunteers on behalf of Respondent and its parent, the Episcopal
Diocese of Utah, in the negotiation of the loan agreement with HUD,
the selection of the building site, the construction of tne complex,
and the selection of the managing agent; none of the volunteers were
compensated for any of this time.

In addition,
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the Episcopal

Diocese incurred approximately $1500 in travel expenses for these
endeavors, none of which was reimbursed by Respondent.
Besides its sizable contributions in establishing St.
Mark's Tower, Respondent makes substantial contributions to insure
the proJect's continued operation.

Respondent's Board of Directors

meets monthly to make the policy decisions necessary for the
proJects continued successful operation.

Again, these individuals

volunteer their services.
Thus, the record in this case demonstrates that Respondent
is not acting as a mere passive conduit for funds given it by the
federal government, as Appellant would have this Court believe.

In

fact, Respondent has incurred substantial monetary obligations, and
has generously donated its services to bring about the creation and
continued operation of St. Mark's Tower, a commitment consisting of
"the generous giving of one's talents and goods to those in need
thereof" that is the essence of charity.
P.2d at 975.

United Presbyterian, 448

While Respondent does not wish to denigrate the

contributions made by others, it respectfully submits that St.
Mark's Tower would not be in existence today without the
contributions made by Respondent.
VI. RESPONDENT'S ACTIVITIES BENEFIT THE COMMUNITY.
Under Utah law, for an activity to be "charitable," it must
provide a benefit to the community by serving a social need.
Charity has been defined as "activities •
general improvement and betterment of mankind

rendered for the
[which] benefit

the community as a whole or an unascertainable and indefinite
portion thereof."

B. P.O. E. No. 85 v. Tax Commission, 536 P.
-21-

1214,

1216 (Utah 1975), quoted with approval in

bSb P. <u

at 1194.
Appellant, citing Salt Lake Lodye No.

bS B.P.u.E. v.

Groesbeck, 120 P. 192, 194 (Utah 1911), argues that the only cyfle

vt

benefit to the community which may support an exemption is one which
reduces governmental expenditures.

Yet a careful reaaing of

Groesbeck reveals that this Court required such a quid pro quo not
for a use to be "charitable," but only for a loose construction ot
the exemption on the issue of whether the property was being used
exclusively for charitable purposes, i.e. whether an exemption could
survive if the property was used for both charitable and
non-charitable purposes.

Id. at 193-4.

Since there has been no

"mixed use" issue raised in this case -- the only use issue oeing
whether the sole use of tne property is charitable
test is not relevant here.

the Groesoec'

In addition, it should be noted that

Groesbeck was overruled by Loyal Order of Moose No.
Board of Equalization, 657 P.2d 257

259 v. County

(Utah 1982), beginning January

1, 1983.
A broader meaning of charity, one which recognizes that a
reduction in governmental expenditures is but one form of a benefit
to the community, was given in B.P.O.E. No. 85 v. Tax Commission:
A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully
defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with the existing
laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either
by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of
education or religion, by relieving their bodies from aisease,
suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish
themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public
buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of
government.
536 P.2d at 1216-17.
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The record in this case shows clear and uncontradicted
of the benefits to the community generated by St. Mark's
Tower:
1.

The complex saves the state more than the

estimated $40,000 annually which would be gained in property tax
revenues because many of the residents would otherwise go into
nursing homes, where they would be cared for at state expense
through the Medicaid program.*
2.

Those tenants not eligible for Medicaid provided

nursing home care would be forced to live alone in single room
occupancy "flophouses", where the often unsafe and unsanitary
living conditions have a profoundly deleterious effect on the
physical and psychological health of their elderly residents.
St. Mark's Tower benefits these people by providing them with
activities, fellowship and safe, sanitary living conditions.
This environment is especially conducive to the physical and
mental well-being of the residents.

A similar project was held

to provide a benefit to the community in Franciscan, where the
court noted that the activities "and the continued companionship
available for such projects does help prolong life and health by
reaffirming the sense that life is worth living, that society
cares."

566 S.W.2d at 225.

* A simple mathematical illustration confirms this. Thus
the total estimated average annual income of the 102 tenants is
$469,000 (102 x $4600).
The cost of nursing home care is estimated
at $1,000 per month (Tr. 35), or $1,224,000 for the 102 tenants.
As
$469,000 would totally exhaust the combined income of these elderly
persons the difference of $755,000 would have to be paid from some
other segment of society.
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3.

The type of care proviued bi ::it. t'larK's Tower is

viewed as the most cost eftecti·;e, i.e.

the method tnat reaucec

the cost to society as a whole of caring for elaerly ana
handicapped people.

Were the residents placed in nursing homes,

others would be paid to provide them services -- such as bathiny
and dressing them

that they are able to perform oy

themselves, at no cost to society, at St. Mark's Tower.

If the

residents were living in private apartments scattered throughout
the county, extra costs would be incurred in delivering to them
health care and other social services. By sparing society as a
whole significant expenditures in caring for

its residents, St.

Mark's Tower is providing the type of benefit to che community
that merits a property tax deduction under B.P.O.E. No. 85 and
Salt Lake County v. Tax Commission.
Appellant argues that any benefit leading to a reduction in
state government expenditures -- specifically, Medicaid -- should be
ignored in determining the benefit to the community, because the tax
here was assessed not by the state, but by Salt Lake County.

This

position finds no support in Article XIII, § 2 of the State
Constitution, which gives absolutely no indication that a piece ot
property could be exempt from state taxation yet subJect to county
taxation, or vice versa.

There is also no indication that

eligibility for an exemption could depend on the allocation ot
social service responsibilities between the state ana its counties,
Furthermore, this contention overlooks the fact that a county's
taxing power is derived solely from the state legislature; if
property is deemed to be used for charitable purposes because it
-24-

reduces state expenditures or otherwise benefits the community, the
state is prohibited from taxing it unuer Article XIII, § 2, and the
state cannot circumvent the prohibition by authorizing a county to
tax the property; since the county derives its taxing power solely
from the state under Article XIII,
§

§

5 and Utah Code Ann.

17-4-3[5], any tax tnat the state cannot assess cannot be assessed

oy a county.
That the community benefits greatly from housing for the
elderly and handicapped is recognized by many Federal and State
statutes, which have expressed a strong public policy in favor of
the type of housing provided by St. Mark's Tower.

The Utah State

Legislature, in the Public Welfare portion of the Utah Code,
§

55-18-1

(1974), stated:

It is declared to be the policy of the state of Utah
to promote the general welfare of its citizens that it is
necessary to remedy the uns.afe and unsanitary housing conditions
and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings
for families of low income, in urban and rural areas.
These
conditions cause an increase and spread of disease and crime,
and constitute a menace to the health, safety, morals and
welfare of the state.
It is the policy of the state of Utah to
make adequate provision of housing for persons of low income,
for elderly persons of low income, for handicapped persons of
low income, for vetrans of low income unable to provide
themselves with decent housing on the basis of benefits
available to them through certain government guarantees of loans
available to them through certain government guarantees of loans
for purchase of residential property, and during lmited periods,
housing for disaster victims.
The provision of safe and
sanitary dwelling accommodations at rents or prices which
persons of low income can afford will materially assist in
developing more desirable neighborhoods and alleviating the
effects of poverty in this state.
The purposes of this act are
t meet these problems by providing low-cost housing for
low-income persons and to encourage cooperation between
political subdivisions thereby making available low-cost housing
facilities in all areas of the state.
It is in the public
interest to utilize the board financial resources and technical
services available to government in cooperation with the
ingenuity and expertise of private enterprise to alleviate this
-25-

lack of safe and sanitary dwellinc;s wl111._
industry.
It should be noted thc:it

SLl\_·11

·' ;,i,11L1tir1•J
ut

pq11,__·1

lucdl
nuL

unl:

applies to actions by government, but that tt1 is snal l be uone "in
cooperation with the ingenuity and expertise of private enterprise."
Congress articulated a similar purpose when it passeo the
National Housing Act:
The Congress finds that there is a large ana growiny
need for suitable housing for older people both in urban and
rural areas.
Our older citizens face special problems in
meeting their housing needs because of the prevalence of mooest
and limited incomes among the elderly, their difficult; in
obtaining liberal long-term home mortgage credit, and their neec
for housing planned ano designed to incluoe features necessary
to the safety and convenience of the occupants in a suitable
neighborhood environment.
The Congress further finos that tne
present programs for housing the elderly unoer the Department ot
Housing and Urban Development have proven the value of Feaeral
credit assistance in this field and at the same time
demonstrated the urgent need for an expanded ano more
comprehensive effort to meet our responsibilities to our senior
citizens.
12 U.S.C.A. § 170lr

(1980).

Congress reaffirmed these purposes in the Low-Income
Housing Act:
It is the policy of the United States to promote tne
general welfare of the Nation by employing its funds and creait,
as provided in this chapter, to assist tne several btates ana
their political subdivisions to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary
housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe, ano
sanitary dwellings for families of lower income and,
inconsistent with the obJectives of this chapter, to vest in
local public housing agencies the maximum amount of
responsibility in the aaministration of tneir housing
programs.
42 u.s.c.A 1437

(Supp.

1982).

A report to the Special Committee on Aging of tl1e Unitecc:
States Senate in 1978 stated:
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Out-of-reach housing expenses are not tne only
problem.
There is also widespread and growing unavailability of
shelters suiteu to varying housing needs of entire groups of
elderly persons.
For example, a recent report issued by tnis
committee described the needs of frail and impaired olaer
persons ana estimated that upwards of 200,00U, such indiviauals
would annually choose to resiae in congregate housing if it were
available, offering meal service, housekeeping aid, personal
assistance, and other services necessary to maintain
independence and dignity.
The need for such service-supplemented shelter will
continue to increase;new estimates just obtained by the
committee indicate that, between now and the year 2000, the
"graying" of the population will accelerate; the percentage of
older persons more than 75 years of age will increase from 3&
percent to 45 percent of the total post-65 population.
Without
new housing resources, such persons will probably be forced into
costly and premature institutionalization in nursing homes,
hospitals, and other medical facilities.
Legislation now in
preparation would expand the availability of congregate services
within federally assisted housing programs.
This information paper describes another group of
older Americans.
They have been described as "the invisible
elderly" and they reside alone in single-room occupancy (SRO)
hotels which are generally located in decaying and crime-ridden
sections of urban America.
Single Room Occupancv; A Need For National Concern, June, 1978,
G.P.0. Stock No.

042-070-04542-6, p.

iii.

These quotations reflect governmental recognition of our
society's desperate need for housing for our low-income elderly.
They also show that the lack of such housing puts strains upon other
community resources.

It is difficult to believe that steps taken to

help remedy this need and reauce the strain on other
resources would not be classified as "charitable."
CONCLUSION
The property known as St. Mark's Tower is being used
exclusively for charitable purposes under Article XIII, § 2 of the
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Constitution of the State of Utah.

The

dec1s1un of

D1str1ct

Court should therefore be
DATED this

C\,,),

cL

day ot June,

1903.

FABIAN &
A Professional Corporation

ton
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